Have you met the Target.com “fail doggie?”
He’s cute, but if you are a Target customer, you don’t really want to encounter him in a browser. I met the “fail doggie” while using the MyKeynote portal to research the nature and extent of the major outage that occurred on Tuesday, September 13th 2011. That was the day that Target began allowing online purchases of “Missoni by Target” items.

A lot at stake
According to one source, the Target site re-build from scratch, launched just weeks before this incident, drew on the talents of over 20 vendors, including many of the biggest names in the e-commerce technology space.
Imagine spending millions of dollars and two years of time to “create a more user-friendly, reliable experience” and then have this happen. Not fun. When a major event like this outage happens, it can be difficult to get complete details from any one participant.
Passions are high when a crisis like this occurs. Where can you go to get an objective vantage point from which to make accurate assessments and analysis? At Keynote Systems, we’ve long been looked to as a neutral third-party with accurate and actionable Internet and mobile performance data, and that day proved to be no exception.
In this blog post, I’ll explain how I used the tools that every Keynote customer has in MyKeynote along with measurements being run for two of our public web performance indices to determine what users were seeing that day and the following morning and to determine just how extensive the outage was.
Target.com appears in a number of our public index measurements, so I had several to pick from – note that we never publish insights based on a customers’ private data, but only based on publicly available data that we collected without payment by any company. Two were particularly useful for figuring out what was going on and capturing screenshots as the day went on. The first measurement visited their home page only, while the second arrived at the home page and then performed a multiple step transaction, just as a customer would when shopping, placing items in a cart and checking out.
First a brief bit of background: both scripts were written in the Keynote Internet Testing Environment, known as KITE and both measurements were being run with our real browser product, Keynote Transaction Perspective. I point that out so you’ll know that none of what you will see here was retrieved by a “bot” or other emulation system; we were getting the experience of a user launching an actual Internet Explorer browser to go visit Target.com.
How things went down that day
As word of the outage quickly spread, we started taking calls from various news media companies asking if we had data. We took a look at the home page monitoring scatter plot below and saw what looked like a brief spike in response times followed by a restoration of reasonable response times shortly thereafter.

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At first glance, it was tempting to say that the outage had been brief and thus was relatively uneventful. But a deeper look at the chart revealed telltale signs that something was not right. Notice the distribution of the dots before and after the spike? See how they are randomly distributed somewhere between two and six seconds before the spike (time on the network is on the left scale) but then they are all tightly packed down below the one-second mark afterword?
Each of those dots represents a full visit with a real browser, so I could click down on any of them to see a listing of what was on each of those pages and how long it took to get to the browser. I did that eventually, but much like an operations team technician would be at such a moment, I was in triage mode at this point. The first thing I wanted to do was to look for clues as to why those dots were organized as they were.
First, I hovered my mouse over a datapoint from before the spike in performance. This would be my “normal” baseline to compare to. Notice that the page contained 147 elements (separate downloaded objects) and a total size of about 2 MB. The time on the network to download the page and all elements was 5.156 seconds.

Next, I took a look at the two red triangles, which represent pages where we know there was an error of some sort or another:
In this case, the element count and page size were lower than the baseline but the time to download was skyrocketing to a number eight times higher. The lower object count and page size were due to timeouts being hit… we couldn’t get all of the objects into the browser before time was up, so the agent running the browser quit trying and reported the error.
What was really interesting was the object count from the very next green dot after the red triangles.
That data point showed only one page element and a very small download size of 640 bytes.
One element? I knew that if we had downloaded only one element, that it must be the base page of html, but a page with only 640 bytes couldn’t possibly have much to say. That was my first clue that visitors were probably getting raw error messages.
I quickly scanned over the remaining “spiky” datapoints after the incident began and found more of the same: just one page element and a size of 639 or 640 bytes. Here’s the last point caught during that initial spike:
So that was all fairly consistent with a site failure; something went very wrong around 8:00am EDT and the server took a long time to send out a very small page that was probably just an error message.
What about all of those green dots hugging the bottom line after the spike had subsided? I hovered over a few and got the same thing each time: 5 page elements and a page size of 31550 bytes.
This wasn’t some random subset of the real page and no error was being recorded, so clearly these speedy responses were something altogether different.
Now it was finally time to start drilling in for some details. I clicked one of those data points and made my way to the page detail waterfall graph:
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Welcome to our waiting room
I hovered over each of the bars and noticed that each object came from a folder called “spawaitingroom.” The image files consisted of a red stripe, a Target logo and a photo of the Target dog posing next to a tool box. I had met the “fail doggie” for the first time:

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So let’s recap what I had learned so far:
- Initial data points have no page objects… just the base page, and that base page was TINY (640 bytes) in comparison to the pages that preceded it, but the amount of time the server took to return that page was HUGE.
- The datapoints following the big spike downloaded much faster and had larger base pages but only had five page elements instead of the 140+ found in the normal pages.
- Drilling in on the five-element page datapoints, I found that all five of the objects came from a folder called “spawaitingroom” – the “fail doggie” was part of a “waiting room” feature that was being served in lieu of the real home page.
Getting the whole picture: what were people actually seeing?
I was making good progress, but I still had a lot of questions to answer. I could guess that a Target dog next to a toolbox was probably some variation of an “under construction” page, but I didn’t have the text of the page yet. I really wanted to know what those pages looked like but all I had were some pieces to the puzzle.
The thing that was complicating my sleuthing was that neither the original 640-byte server error pages nor the fail doggie pages were being sent as an “error” (http status of 4xx or 5xx) – they were being sent as successful pages (http status 200). That prevented me from getting as much diagnostic information as I otherwise might have. I could poke around at each scatterplot and piece together what I was seeing, but without an error, I wasn’t going to have the html from the page or any screenshots, both of which MyKeynote stores on a fatal error. Fortunately, all was not lost. There's a benefit in more than 400,000,000 objects per day stored away inside MyKeynote.
Web Content Trending to the rescue
Here’s where the other measurement that was scripted to go five steps deep into the target.com site came in very handy. The second monitoring script was set up to do the following:
- Go to the target.com home page.
- Perform a search for “lil wayne”
- Filter the search results to the “music” category.
- Click on the first album in the resulting list to view the details.
- Click the “add to cart.” button on the details page and then confirm that “1 item added to cart.” appears on the screen.
Without the real site being served up, there was no way the script could complete the search for an album. When the Keynote agent piloting the Internet Explorer browser went to find the search box and type “lil wayne” into it, there was no search box. The resulting error provided a steady stream of screenshots of the home page throughout the day.
Let me explain a little more about why I got the screenshots. With Keynote’s Web Content Trending option turned on, every screen is proactively captured and if an error is detected in subsequent steps, all captured screenshots are saved to the MyKeynote portal to support troubleshooting by our customers. If there is no error, the proactive screenshots are discarded before ever being sent to the database. Every time the second step failed, (which was on EVERY visit at this point), the screenshot of the home page taken on arrival was stored.
To get those screenshots, I simply had to drill into the scatterplot chart and I saw this:

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I clicked on that “E” which is the error recorded for the second step and saw the page details screen below. I have added callouts so you can see where the links to the screenshot and html are:

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Things were about to get a lot clearer in a hurry.
The wrong kind of "direct communication"
I clicked on the thumbnail of the screen snapshot and sighed as I saw what visitors had seen in the moments when the site became unusable around 7:58-8:00am:
We captured the above screenshot at 8:01am. It shows what the 640 and 639 byte html pages with no images looked like in the browser. This is a raw server error that was passed through all the way to users’ browsers (something developers and operations teams work very hard to avoid).
In the minutes that followed, the target.com team took rapid action to replace the cryptic server error with something more friendly.
By 8:14 am, we had captured the first of those friendlier images; the “fail doggie” page made its debut. About 17 minutes later we captured a new version of the page. We saw additional changes again at 11:30 and 12:38. It should be noted that these are times when we visited with the transaction-based measurement and that particular measurement was only set to visit ten times per hour. The point is that these times are when we observed the pages and made captures, not necessarily the exact times that they changed.
Here, then, is the full gallery of “fail doggie” pages we recorded:
8:14 am EDT – “Oh no”
This page requested the user to “please try again” and provided a single link to “Target help”

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8:31am EDT – “Hello”
This page let folks know the team was “hard at work making the site better” and dropped the “please try again” in favor of “Sorry for the inconvenience – we’ll be back up and running shortly. It also featured links to three services that were still online: redcard, weekly ad, and find a store.

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11:30 – “Woof” #1
Around 11:30 the message changed to “We are suddenly extremely popular.” Visitors were also asked to “Please stay here and we’ll try to get you in as soon as we can!” Finally, this version also explained what the three links that began appearing in the previous version were, saying “We are up and running here” just above the links.

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12:38pm EDT – “Woof” #2
This version added a plea to not keep hitting refresh, something that can make bringing a site back up very difficult when a large group is all doing it at the same time: “Please know that there is no need to refresh your browser. Your request will automatically retry in 30 seconds.” This was the most well organized page, broken into four separate paragraphs, and adding back in an apology with the sentence, “Thank you and our apologies for the inconvenience.”

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Sizing up the impact: just how bad was it, and for how long?
I was starting to put it all together. Now I knew what the raw server error looked like and I had a play-by-play set of screen captures showing how the “waiting room” page evolved over time that morning.
What I still wanted to know was just how “unavailable” the site had been. Were any users getting through to the real home page at any point? The fail doggie page said it would auto-refresh in 30 seconds and implied that perhaps one might eventually get through. Was the real home page ever turning up, and if so how often?
I waited until the next morning to size up the duration and intensity of the outage. My goal was to confidently establish an “end point” for the incident and then do the numbers.
How can you measure “availability” when the site is displaying “OK” pages, but not the right ones?
The home page only measurement had the highest frequency (about 40 per hour) so I wanted to use that to calculate availability. There are many different reports and graphs in the MyKeynote portal, and most of them will tell you at a glance what your “availability” is – that is, what percentage of the measurements succeeded versus failed in some way. The catch here was that server error and “fail doggie” pages were sent to the browser as “OK” (http status 200) pages, not errors.
Scripts can be easily enhanced with validations that look either for required text that should be there or error text that should not be there. Either validation option would have marked the server message or fail doggie pages as errors and impacted the built-in availability calculation, but the index measurement I was using didn’t have that validation in place. In practice, validation is usually used at the end of a multi-page script to be sure the right final page had been reached. Fortunately the information we needed to answer the questions was readily available anyway (more on that below). We just had to step back and consider the available tools to size it up.
The tool I chose to use was MyKeynote’s Object Trending report. This report is available for any measurement that has been configured with our Web Content Trending (WCT) option. WCT stores performance information for every object in the page, not just a roll-up for the page as a whole. Once again, storing all those details day and night was about to become very handy.
The Object Trending report has several options, all of which provide ways to view the performance of page elements over time. To display it, I chose the Target measurement, selected Object Trending and set the date range to the 24 hour period after the incident had begun:

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Here’s what that report looks like by default, which is a separate line for each domain that objects originated from:

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The above default view is great for determining if one or more domains are particularly slow or unavailable, but I needed even more detail than that, so I dropped down the menu at the bottom of the graph and changed it to “Object data by object without parameters:”
This option would give me each separate element in the page, ignoring any query-string data that might be appended to the object name. Think of the home page as a stage with a cast of characters. The object trending report was about to show me who had appeared in what number of performances.
I clicked “Generate Graph Now” and scrolled down to the table below the graph. Now I had a listing of the frequency of every object that had appeared on the home page from 8:00am EDT onward:

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What I was particularly interested in was the object name on the left and the “Included datapoints” on the right. Every visit always had retrieved at least the base page (www.target.com). By comparing the count of base pages observed to the count of all the other objects, I could make some meaningful conclusions about how often the “fail doggie” had been turning up.
I needed to do a little math, so I pulled the results into an Excel spreadsheet with a simple copy and paste, sorted by the datapoints column and added a new column to compare the count of each element to the count of the base page. I did this a number of times, varying the time period a bit to narrow in on useful takeaways.
For starters, I re-ran the report to look just at the objects observed in the first hour between 8:00am EDT and 9:00am EDT. The cast of characters is quite small; we either got just the base page of html, or the base page plus the elements of the fail doggie page. Remember, these aren’t observations of all user traffic, they are the results observed by the visits of our real browser agents. While we were just a drop in the bucket of actual visitors, we did make it through to the site 31 times in that first hour. Here’s what we saw: The “fail doggie” appeared just 55% of the time and we got nothing but the base page in the remaining 45% of visits. The hundreds of thousands (or millions) of users attempting to visit during that same period likely saw a similar mix.

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So I could see that things had been pretty “messy” during the initial confusion of the incident. An hour of outage is worth a lot of money to a site like target.com, and cryptic errors couldn’t have been good for inspiring confidence, but an hour is just an hour and perhaps many people hadn’t even tried to visit the site yet.
The next question I wanted to answer was, “What percentage of Target.com’s traffic was able to make it to the home page throughout the rest of the day?”
Here’s a view of my spreadsheet based on running the Object Trending report for the period starting one hour after the incident (9:00am EDT) and ending at midnight that evening:
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So taking the big view of that entire day up to midnight EDT (which is 9pm Pacific time), I determined that 93% got the fail doggie and no more than 7% got through to the real home page.
Not pretty no matter how you slice it
I re-ran the report with various time windows, and the results varied only slightly. Most surprisingly, even pushing the end time all the way to 9am the following day, the stats still showed that 85% of all visits got the fail doggie page elements. Focusing on Midnight 9/14/11 to 9:00am 9/14/11 the number was still high at 75%. Was this all cleared up by the start of business on 9/14/11? Looking at just the hour between 8:00am and 9:00am that second day 9/14/11, the number was still an amazing 50%.
By this time my boss was wondering why I was spending so much time with all those spreadsheets and charts, so I stopped my investigation there and moved on to share updated results with all the folks that had been asking for data. I annotated a screenshot of a scatterplot graph and wrote a narrative to go with it, sharing the details with several media outlets and even conducting a radio interview with Wall Street Journal Radio. Here are a couple of links to places the results showed up, along with a copy of that annotated scatter-plot graph.
Investor’s Business Daily: Target Website Crash Offers Lessons
Retail Online Integration: What You Can Learn From Target's Site Crash

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Epilog:
The one question I left unanswered was just how many truly useful pages there had been in the 7% that were not “fail doggie” pages. I’m curious how many would have actually allowed a customer to purchase. Given the size of Target.com’s typical traffic this time of year (reported as 29.5 million for the month of the prior October by Investor’s Business Daily), I was pretty content to stop with the work I had done over those two days, observing with a long sigh that the folks at Target, who are no amateurs at online retail, had missed out on a LOT of potential transactions by turning away something north of 93% of all visitor attempts that first day.